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Haque, Samiul. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2014. US Commodity Support 
Payments: On Allocation of Resources and Fairness, Post 1996. Major Professor: Kenneth 
Foster  
  
This dissertation investigates the effect of US commodity support payment on 
agricultural producer decisions during the “decoupled” regime. Particular attention is paid 
to the national optimal output mix, input proportions, and farm level changes in scale 
operations. While “decoupled” payments were instated to comply with WTO guidelines, 
where tax payer dollars cannot be spent to alter agricultural outputs and /or on farm input 
decisions, evidence suggests that such payments are far from being decoupled. At the 
national level, this dissertation finds evidence for mild labor input using and capital input 
economizing behavior. Substantial land input economizing behavior and moderate material 
input using behavior due to scale effects of crop production is also observed. However, 
such a policy does not appear to alter the optimal output mix. The finding that government 
payments alter the scale of national crop production is further validated while looking at 
the farm level changes in scale of operation. Farm level data was analyzed using quantile 
regressions, where the effect of payments on the entire distribution of conditional farm size 
was quantified. The findings suggest that government payments do increase farm size at 
xi 
 
some parts of the conditional distribution and not others, and these effects are bigger for 
larger farms. This dissertation provides empirical evidence that commodity support 
programs provide advantage to large farming operations in terms of increasing scale of 
operation. Perhaps as heterogeneous farmers enlarge or diminish their share of agricultural 
production, the marketplace systematically selects those with similar management 









Farm commodity programs were initially instated during the 1930s Depression 
when commodity prices were low due to weak consumer demand. Policy makers legislated 
price support and supply control programs in order to stabilize income of farmers (25% of 
the US population lived on farms at that time), most of whom were small in scale and 
diversified, and to ensure abundant supply of food and fiber (CRS 2008). Since the 
inception of commodity programs, the face of US agriculture has changed substantially 
with less than 2% of the US population now living on farms and agricultural production 
has now shifted to larger farm operations. While commodity programs of the 1930s were 
intended to be temporary, they have survived to this date with numerous modifications. 
The persistence of commodity programs can no doubt be attributed to a strong agricultural 
lobby, but one cannot simply ignore the presence of some tangible public support. 
 This dissertation focuses on the “decoupled” era, starting from the 1996 FAIR Act, 
where commodity support payments were divorced from market outcomes. The transition 
from traditional price support and supply control programs to one where payments were 
tied to historical acreage and yields of program crops was prompted by the impetus to 
comply with WTO guidelines. Such guidelines required member states to adopt a policy 
where taxpayer dollars cannot be used to influence production levels and on farm decisions.  
However, since their inception, there has been significant misgivings both within the 
academic community and policy circles about the “decoupled” nature of these payments 
and fairness of disbursements and subsequent economic outcomes. 
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There are many channels by which decoupled payments might affect production 
and / or on farm decisions (for reviews, see OECD, 2005 and Bhaskar and Beghin, 2009). 
While it is not the aim of this dissertation to dissect all the various channels, it should be 
noted that each of the different research concentrates in some way or another on the 
potential of decoupled payments to alter agricultural producer behavior. The objective of 
this dissertation is to inform the misgivings regarding such farm programs in two ways: 1) 
by introducing a neglected aspect of lump sum transfers in altering the underlying 
production technology of national US agriculture. In particular, the role of decoupled 
payments in altering the national output mix (output bias) and relative proportions of input 
use (input bias) is investigated 2) by  addressing the questions about fairness- where higher 
payment levels accrue to large farm operations simply by design of the program. As such, 
it has been argued that decoupled payments provide unfair advantage to large farming 
operations as compared to their smaller counterparts. There is a third contribution of this 
dissertation, where the finite samples properties of the Minimum Distance estimator 
framework of hypothesis testing for quantile regression is investigated using Monte Carlo 
simulations. This contribution should be viewed as complementary to the second objective 
rather than a standalone goal.             
 
1.2 Overview of the Essays Included in this Dissertation 
In this dissertation, the units of observation range from national time series data 
(chapter 2), individual farm level data (chapter 3), and simulated dataset (chapter 4). While 
the dissertation is organized to allow each chapter to stand alone as an independent essay, 
some general conclusions will be drawn in the end (chapter 5). 
The first dissertation essay focuses in the econometric estimation of output and 
input bias of US Direct Payments. The study is conducted on US national agricultural 
productivity time series data 1948-2011. The empirical framework allows Direct Payments 
to alter the input and output expansion path. A system of equations consisting of a translog 
cost function, along with relevant input cost share and output revenue share of cost is 
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estimated with 3 stage iterative seemingly unrelated regression. The results suggest that 
such payment programs are mildly labor and capital input economizing, strongly land input 
economizing, and moderately material input using. Such effects has been largely ignored 
in the past literature and should provide important considerations in future policy 
formulation.    
The second dissertation essay focuses on econometrically investigates the 
differential impact of commodity support payments on farm size of US corn-soy and wheat 
producers. The study was conducted on farm level panel data obtained from US Census of 
Agriculture (1997, 2002, and 2007). Unlike previous work which focuses on the impacts 
on the conditional mean, the current approach, using recent advancements in correlated 
random effects quantile regression model, quantifies the impact of government payments 
at different locations along the entire conditional distribution of farm size. The results show 
that government payments increase farm size at some parts of the farm size distribution 
and not others, and these effects are larger for bigger farms. Both corn-soy and wheat 
producers at the 85th percentile of the conditional farm size distribution are almost four 
times more responsive to a dollar increase in commodity payments per acre than those at 
the 25th percentile. This paper provides empirical evidence that commodity support 
programs provide unfair advantage to large farming operations.  
 The third essay investigates the finite sample properties of the Minimum Distance 
(MD) estimator framework of testing equality of slopes for quantile regressions. This study 
complements the second dissertation essay where the same hypothesis testing framework 
is used for statistical inference. Past studies have established that the test statistic has a 
limiting chi-squared distribution with appropriate degrees of freedom. With applications 
of quantile regressions on panel data gaining popularity amongst applied econometricians 
in recent years, it becomes important to investigate the power and size of the MD test for 
finite sample. Results suggest that the test has under sized and low power in small samples. 
However, with larger samples, while the power property improves, the test still remains 
under sized. Given the second dissertation essay utilizes very large sample size, the 
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CHAPTER 2: ON SOME UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF DIRECT 





Direct payments operate as a lump-sum transfer to farm operators with receipts 
determined solely by historical participation in commodity support programs.  These 
payments were instituted in 2002 to extend production flexibility contracts (PFCs) of the 
1996 Farm Bill which overhauled U.S. farm programs to better comply with international 
trade commitments. As these payments do not depend on market conditions, they are 
assumed not to affect production levels or on-farm input decisions, and thus qualify as 
“green box” subsidies, i.e. those subsidies which are least trade distorting in the 
GATT/WTO lexicon. However, the academic literature has advanced various theoretical 
models and conducted empirical studies that suggest direct payments do alter production 
level (albeit minimally) and on-farm input decisions.  
 Among the extant literature, none thus far has explicitly examined the role of direct 
payments in altering relative proportion of input use (input bias) and output mix (output 
bias) at the national level. The objective of this study is to fill the void by econometrically 
estimating these effects. Analysis of these effects at the national level is crucial to the 
debate over direct payments since it is at this level that trade distortion will be measured. 
Literature suggesting that decoupled payments alter output, albeit minimally, and on-farm 
input use at the farm level, provides the impetus to potentially observe bias in relative input 
use and or output mix at the national level. Recognizing and estimating such possible 
impacts would provide important considerations for the development of future agricultural 
policies.     
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Hennessy (1998) modeled risk averse producer behavior and showed that the higher 
average income (wealth effect) and income stabilization (insurance effect) due to direct 
payments will lead to increased input usage and expected output. Using Kansas farm data, 
Serra, Goodwin, and Featherstone (2011) found evidence of decreasing absolute risk 
aversion and increasing relative risk aversion preferences, but found miniscule effect of 
direct payments on agricultural output. As for acreage response, Goodwin and Mishra 
(2006) found negligible impact of direct payments.  Payments may preserve inefficient 
producers, but they are not likely to have a marked output impact (Chau and de Gorter, 
2005). Also farmers in the crop sector may use direct payments to continue or expand 
economically non-viable production (Hennessey and Thorne, 2005).          
While investigating the effect of direct payments on labor input, El-Osta, Mishra, 
and Ahearn (2004) found that government payments increase on-farm hours worked by 
farm operators but the impact was quantitatively very small. This result is at odds with the 
standard household model theory- lump sum transfers unambiguously should have no 
effect on on-farm labor. Key and Roberts (2009) reconcile this issue by developing a 
theoretical model where, with decreasing marginal utility to income, decoupled payments 
may reduce off-farm work and increase on-farm work. Key and Roberts (2009), 
reverberating the notions of Hennessey and Thorne (2005), finds compelling evidence for 
substantial non-pecuniary benefits to farming. On-farm labor may also increase if 
government payments work to prevent exit of non-profitable farms as suggested by Chau 
and de Gorter (2005).  
Under incomplete credit markets, the effects of these lump sum transfers can be 
significant. A credit constrained farmer may use direct payments for more on-farm 
investment and production (Collender and Morehart, 2004). This is assuming that the 
return to investment is higher than the interest rate available in the credit market, while a 
loan could not be obtained. Goodwin and Mishra (2006) found that the interaction of 
producer flexibility contract with a producer’s debt to asset ratio, has a small negative 
influence on the number of acres idled. Kropp and Whitaker (2011) concludes that because 
of capital cost reduction due to direct payments, some farms may increase input use or 
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operate on land that would be otherwise be unprofitable. Roe, Somwaru, and Diao (2008) 
suggests that direct payments improve access to credit for producers both by directly 
increasing their wealth, and through a higher land price that increases the collateral.     
Given decoupled payments are tied to land holdings, the landlord then is likely to 
appeal to the inelastic supply of land and try to capture most of the subsidy through higher 
land rent.  In turn, this increases land values; Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003), and 
Goodwin, Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne (2003) find credible evidence of capitalization of 
direct payments in land values. Higher land prices translate into higher input costs over 
time for producers and decrease the return to investment. If, in fact, landowners capture 
most of the direct payment dollars, tenants might either substitute away from land in favor 
of other inputs and/or decrease crop production intensity. Additionally, the tenants might 
decide to focus more on livestock production, assuming that it requires lower land input. It 
is important to recognize, however, that landlords might not always be able to capture a 
greater share of the direct payment dollar.  Kirwan (2009) found a 25/75 landlord-tenant 
split of the marginal subsidy dollar. The reason cited is less than perfectly competitive land 
markets. Farm consolidation and growth has resulted in fewer and larger scale tenants who 
are likely to exercise greater market power in the land rental market. Thus landlords who 
forgo the use value of land without a tenant might be willing to compromise and share the 
subsidy to attract tenants. We would add that observable heterogeneity in farm 
management and land stewardship among tenants in local markets further exacerbates the 
lack of competition in rental markets.    
Furthermore, there is evidence of positive association between government 
payments and farm business survival (Key and Roberts, 2006), likelihood of survival and 
a small yet positive impact on the size of surviving farms (Key and Roberts, 2007), and 
subsequent growth in farmland concentration (Roberts and Keys, 2008). However, the 
implication for aggregate market outcome is less clear. For, example, O’Donoghue and 
Whitaker (2010) constructed a pseudo panel from the ARMS data and utilized the 
exogenous change in the 2002 Farm bill that allowed oil seeds to be included.  They found 
that direct payments increase individual acreage by 9-16%. While Weber and Key (2012) 
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make use of same policy variation on the NASS data at the zip code level, and found little 
effect on aggregate production.  
  As heterogeneous farmers enlarge or diminish their share of agricultural 
production due to direct payments, it is credible that the market generated composition of 
the agricultural sector will shift to a higher proportion of managerially innovative farms. 
As such, it gives rise to the possibility of altering the national production technology and 
observing changes in agricultural input intensities and output mix. Understanding these net 
impacts from direct payments thus calls for a study that employs national data. We follow 
in the tradition of other studies on US agricultural technology (e.g. Binswanger 1974; Ray 
1982) and adopt a cost minimization approach where the mechanism through which direct 
payments affect input and output bias is specifically identified.  
 
2.2 Modeling Framework 
We assume a cost minimizing representative producer to proxy for the aggregate 
technology with the following objective function: 
 𝐶(𝑤, 𝑞, 𝑡) ≡ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑥 𝑤
′𝑥| 𝑥 ∈ 𝐹(𝑥, 𝑞, 𝑡)                                                                      (2.1)                    
where C is cost, w is a vector of prices corresponding to inputs x, q is a vector of outputs, 
t is an exogenous variable that is a proxy for underlying technology, and F(x,q,t) is a 
production possibilities set.  Estimation of the cost model proceeds by deriving the output 
compensated demand function, and inverse supply function (under perfect competition) via 
Shephard’s lemma and estimating them as a system. That is,  
𝑥(𝑤, 𝐸𝑞, 𝑡) =
𝜕𝐶(𝑤,𝐸𝑞,𝑡)
𝜕𝑤
                                                                                                  (2.2) 
and 
𝑝(𝑤, 𝐸𝑞, 𝑡) =
𝜕𝐶(𝑤,𝑞,𝑡)
𝜕𝑞
                                                                                                   (2.3), 
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 where equation (2.3) represents output price (p) equal to marginal cost in the output 
markets. In the production economics literature, it has become common practice to proxy 
the technology index, t, with a time trend.   The time trend is likely correlated with private 
and public research and development, research and extension, changes in relative input and 
output prices, etc. In order to examine our hypothesis that direct payments alter the 
underlying agricultural production technology, we propose to allow technological change 
to also be induced by farm policy payments.  We accomplish this by including a direct 
payment policy variable in the model in addition to the time trend. Direct payment outlays 
follow a more varied and less strongly trended path over time and this reduces the chance 
of mistakenly capturing only a host of trended factors in the measurement of technical 
change.  
This analysis uses a standard translog cost function. The translog functional form 
has been successfully applied to aggregate data in a variety of contexts, and represents a 
flexible second order approximation to the true cost function (see Jorgensen, Christensen, 
and Lau 1973). We specify the cost function as a function of four input prices, and two 
outputs:  








𝑖=1 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑟 
4
𝑟=1 +
















𝑟=1 +  𝜇𝑡 +
1
2⁄ 𝜎𝑡
2 +   ∑ 𝜏𝑟
4
𝑟=1  tln𝑤𝑟 +  ∑ 𝜔𝑖
2
𝑖=1 𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖 +
 𝜅𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑧                                                                                                            (2.4) 
 where ln is the natural logarithm; z denotes the level of government farm payments; 𝑖( j) 
index quantities of livestock and crop outputs; r(s) index prices of labor, capital, land, and 
material inputs. By assuming that farmers are price takers in input and output markets, we 
can use Shepherd’s Lemma to derive the factor cost and output specific revenue (relative 
to total costs) equations.   
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We follow past studies (e.g Kuroda 1988; Kuroda and Lee 2003) to adopt a measure 
of change in output mix (output bias) due to direct payments from Capalbo and Antle 
(1988).  For the two-output cost function, this measure of output bias can be constructed in 




























                                          (2.5), 
where 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄




 can be interpreted as the government payment elasticity of marginal cost 
for output i(j). Technical change in the output space is said to be biased towards output i, 
j, or Hicks neutral if 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 < 0, 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 > 0, or 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 = 0. We can write an expression for 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄
  in 










= 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑗 +
2
𝑗=1
∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑟 + 𝜆𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑧
4
𝑟=1 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡 (see Appendix A for details). We illustrate output bias in 
Figure 2.1 below: 



























 Let e(z1,t) be the initial expansion path in the output space, i.e. the set points reflecting 
least cost method of producing different levels of output, when output prices remain 
constant.  The firm produces at point E1, where the isoquant T1 T1 is tangent to the 
isorevenue line P1. Technological change due to direct payment causes the new expansion 
path to be say e(z2,t). The new production possibility frontier is T2 T2 which passes through 
the point E1. 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄
 measures the a hypothetical rotation of the isorevenue line P1  tangent to 
T1 T1 at E1, to P2 tangent to T2 T2. 
 
 
A second goal of this study is to estimate the degree to which government payment 
led technical change induces bias in relative input use as well as scale effects in production. 
In developing these measures, we follow the approach outlined in Capalbo and Antle 
(1988) which extends the multi-output form of Binswanger’s (1974, 1978) dual measure 
of input bias for a non-homothetic cost function. Capalbo and Antle (1988) define bias over 
the general index of technology, t; in our application bias is measured over the policy 
variable z. Thus, the measure of input bias,𝑀𝐵𝑟







⁄                                                                                             (2.6),  
where 𝑆𝑟 is the share of input r in total cost. 𝑀𝐵𝑟
𝑐 measures the relative change in factor 
proportions brought about by direct payments. A positive (negative) value of 𝑀𝐵𝑟
𝑐 
indicates that direct payment is rth factor using (saving) relative to all other factors of 
production. 𝑀𝐵𝑟
𝑐=0 implies direct payment is neutral, i.e. factor proportions are invariant 
to payment levels. If the technology is non-homothetic, i.e. if the firm’s expansion path in 
the input space is non-linear, the input bias measure in (2.6) has to be adjusted for the scale 
effect, due to movement along the expansion, to obtain the pure bias effect. The pure bias 
of input due to shift in the expansion path for non-homothetic technology is (Antle and 
Capalbo (1988)):  
𝑀𝐵𝑟
𝑐𝑒 = 𝑀𝐵𝑟
𝑐 −  [∑ (𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑠𝑟𝑖 /𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖)(𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶/𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖)
−1] 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶/𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑧                              (2.7). 
Alternatively, equation (2.7) can be denoted in terms of the model parameters, with 






⁄ , and 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐶 𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑧⁄ = 𝜋 =
12 
 




𝑖=1 𝜅𝑡). Taken together, we can rewrite pure bias 











                                                                                          (2.8). 
  
The first term on the right hand side of (2.8) is the same as (2.6), the second term measures 
the scale effect due to livestock production, and the third term measures the scale effect 
due to crop production. Note that these measures bias and scale effects are interpreted as 
elasticities. To facilitate exposition let us consider Figure 2.2 below: 







                    
                    Figure 2.2: Input Bias due to Technical Change  
Let the initial expansion path in the input space be e(z1,t), i.e the set of points associated 
with the least cost method of producing different levels of output, given constant input 
prices.  The firm produces at point A. After technical change we have a new expansion 
path e(z2,t) and the firm produces at point C. Technological advancement has reduced the 
cost of producing output Q1 as shown by the movement from A to C. This movement has 
two components. One is the scale effect, from A to B, change in factor share along a given 












C, representing the shift in the isoquant line along the same isocost line, and the consequent 
change in factor share.   
 
2.3 Data 
Data describing input prices and output quantities were obtained from national 
agricultural productivity statistics published the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA 
2012a) for 1948-2011. Information describing farm program payments are available from 
farm income and wealth statistics published by U.S Department of Agriculture (USDA 
2012b). In this analysis PFC payments from 1996-2002 and direct payments (DP) from 
2002-2011 are included.   The agricultural productivity dataset contains price and quantity 
indices of agricultural outputs and inputs that can be used in the estimation of the cost 
function. Farm data was aggregated into two outputs: livestock and crops, and four inputs: 
labor, capital, land, and material goods. Labor inputs includes both hired and self-employed 
labor. The capital input consists of a range of inputs such as durable equipment, service 
buildings, and inventories. Material inputs include energy, fertilizer and lime, pesticides, 
purchased services, and other intermediate inputs. Aggregate measures of quantities and 
prices were calculated using the Fisher Index, with 2005 as the base year (also point of 
approximation). The summary statistics is provided in table 2.1.  
A couple aspects of this dataset makes it particularly suited for our study. First, 
output prices correspond to the value of output to the producer, i.e., subsidies are added 
and indirect taxes are subtracted from market values. The price received by farmers include 
allowance for net Commodity Credit Corporation loans and purchases by the government 
valued at the average loan rate. However, direct commodity payments are not reflected in 
to price data. This implies, while our variable for direct payments in a series of “zeroes” 
prior to 1996, all “coupled” subsidies are directly incorporated into output prices (p) and 
enters our model through the inverse supply function (2.3). This attribute of the dataset 
assures us that we are in fact observing the impact of direct payments on the production 
technology. Second, land area diverted from production under federal commodity 
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programs and Conservation Reserves are excluded from the stock of land. This ensures that 
we are not incorporating land input that is not directly used in agricultural production.  An 
excellent and detailed description of the methods used to construct the indices is 
documented in Ball, Bureau, Nehring, and Somwaru (1997) and Ball, Wang, and Nehring 
(2012).  
  
2.4 Estimation Strategy 
Estimation was performed on a system of equations derived from a standard 
translog cost function specification:   
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The associated cost and revenue share equations can respectively be written as: 
𝑆𝑟 = 𝛽𝑟 +  ∑ 𝛾𝑟,𝑠𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑠,𝑡 +
4
𝑠=1 ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖,𝑡 +
2
𝑖=1 𝜃𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑧𝑡 +  𝜏𝑟𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡                                      (2.10)  
and 
𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑟,𝑡 +
4
𝑟=1 ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑗,𝑡 +
2
𝑗=1 𝜆𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑧𝑡 +  𝜔𝑡𝑡 +  𝑜𝑡                                     (2.11),  
where 𝑅𝑟 is the revenue share of output r in total cost. We impose the following restriction 
on the cost function to maintain homogeneity of degree one in factor prices: ∑ 𝛽𝑟
4
𝑟=1 = 1, 
∑ 𝛾𝑟,𝑠
4
𝑠=1 = 0, ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑟
4
𝑟=1 = 0,  ∑ 𝜃𝑟
4
𝑟=1 = 0, and ∑ 𝜏𝑟
4
𝑟=1 = 0. Furthermore, symmetry 
implies: 𝛿𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛿𝑗,𝑖 and 𝛾𝑖,𝑗 = 𝛾𝑗,𝑖.         
Initially parameters were estimated using the system of equations consisting of the 
cost function (2.9), three of the four cost share equations (2.10), and the two output specific 
revenue over cost equations (2.11) using an iterative SUR. Preliminary results suggested 
serial correlation of the residuals was a problem, so we used a standard method for 
estimating a common serial correlation coefficient for each equation (Berndt and Savin 
1975). This approach maintains the invariance property of the parameter estimates to the 
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share equation which is dropped from the estimation procedure. Furthermore, our cost 
function specification treats output quantities as predetermined. However, econometrically 
output quantities are endogenous to input decisions and total costs. To address this 
endogeneity, we estimated a first stage OLS of output quantities on a set of variables that 
are assumed to effect output, namely: input quantities, government payments, and time 
trend. Since our cost function is non-linear both in terms of variables and parameters we 
specified a second order polynomial (translog in particular) for the first stage regression 
following Kelejian’s (1971) and Aemiya’s (1974) suggestion. The predicted values from 
the first stage were used to estimate the system of cost function. The system of equations 
was estimated using 3-stage non-linear iterative SUR procedure. Subsequently both input 
and output bias elasticities were computed from the parameter estimates and data. It is 
important to know the precision of these elasticity estimates. Therefore we conducted a 
parametric bootstrap approach to generate an empirical distribution of parameters by 
randomly sampling from the residuals of the 3-stage non-linear iterative SUR estimation 
(Dorfman, Kling, and Sexton, 1990). To preserve the cross-correlation structure of the 
system, we randomly drew with replacement contemporaneous residuals. This was 
conducted two thousand times to create empirical distribution of parameters. These 
distributions of parameters were then used to construct confidence intervals for the 
elasticities.                
 
2.5 Results 
At the point of approximation (year 2005), our fitted model i) is non-decreasing in 
input prices and output quantities ii) has negative own price elasticites of demand for labor, 
capital, land, and material. Parameter estimates for the model and their standard errors are 
reported in Table 2.2. For the estimated cost function, five of the eight  interactions of input 
prices with output quantities (ρ) are statistically significant. This implies that the 
production technology is non-homothetic. Thus requiring adjustment for the scale effects 
of production in computing input bias (2.7).  Note that the actual magnitude of the input 
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and output bias elasticities is non-linear combination of random variables, and cannot be 
inferred from the parameter estimates. Furthermore, the precision of these elasticities has 
to be assed via bootstrapping.  
 
2.5.1 Output Bias 
Estimates for direct payment elasticity of marginal cost and Hicksian output bias 
are presented in Table 2.3 and the associated confidence intervals are reported in Table 2.4. 
It should be noted that these estimated elasticities are statistically insignificant.  Direct 
payment elasticities of marginal cost for livestock and crop production are -0.0247 and 
0.02494 respectively. They imply, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments at the 
point of approximation may decrease the marginal cost for livestock production (by 
0.247%) and increase that of crop production (by 0.2494%). Not surprisingly, our estimate 
for Hicksian output bias (-0.04964) suggests small livestock favoring technological change 
at the national level due to direct payments.  Ceteris paribus, our point estimate of Hicksian 
output bias suggests that increasing direct payments by 10% may decrease the marginal 
cost of livestock output relative to that of crops by approximately 0.496%.  Such a change 
in the relative marginal cost of livestock to crops may represent a significant impact in the 
national markets for commodities and production inputs.  
 
2.5.2 Input Bias 
Table 2.5 reports the point estimates for the input bias, scale effects, and pure bias 
effects (input bias minus the scale effects of production) of factor inputs, and the associated 
confidence intervals are reported in Table 2.6. Our estimates of input bias (as measured by 
(2.6)) suggests small changes in relative factor use did occur in the agricultural input sector 
due to direct payments. This overall measure of input bias suggests that direct payment 
induced technical change in favor of labor and materials inputs, and against capital and 
land inputs. For labor input, our bias estimate of 0.00235 significant at the 5% level implies, 
17 
 
ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments at the point of approximation may 
increase the cost share of labor input relative to all other factors of production be 0.0235%. 
For capital inputs, our bias estimate of -0.00580 significant at the 1% level implies, ceteris 
paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments at the point of approximation may decrease the 
relative cost share of capital input by 0.058%. However, using this measure it is not clear 
whether this bias is due to the direct impact of payments on relative factor use or is the 
artifact of an indirect impact of payments on the scale of farming operations in the presence 
of non-homothetic technology.  
 The scale effects of production reveal distinct factor intensities for livestock versus 
crop production. Our point estimates suggest that direct payments induced scale effects in 
livestock production is labor and land input using, and capital and material inputs saving. 
For crop production, direct payment induced scale effect is labor and land input saving, 
and capital and material inputs using. Our estimate of direct payment induced scale effect 
of land in livestock production (0.02433) significant at the 5% level suggests, ceteris 
paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments at the point of approximation may increase the 
relative cost share of land input by 0.2433%. While the scale effect of land in crop 
production (-0.16775) significant at the 10% level suggests, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase 
in direct payments at the point of approximation may decrease the relative cost share of 
land input by 1.6775%. And the scale effect of material inputs (0.0415) in crop production 
significant at the 5% level implies, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments may 
increase the relative cost share of material inputs by 0.415%.   
 Finally our estimates of pure bias effects (as measured by (7)) suggests bias in favor 
of labor and land input, and against capital and material inputs. This measure captures the 
change in input factor cost share due to shift in the input expansion path due to direct 
payments. Our estimate for pure bias effect of land (0.14269) significant at the 10% level 
suggests, ceteris paribus, a 10% increase in direct payments at the point of approximation 
may increase the relative cost share of land input by 1.4269%. Our estimate for pure bias 
effect of material input (-0.03550) significant at the 10% level suggests,  ceteris paribus, a 
10% increase in direct payments at the point of approximation may decrease the relative 
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cost share of material input by 0.355%. Note that much of the pure input bias is driven by 
quantitatively large scale effect of production induced by direct payments. Our findings 
suggests that direct payments induced changes in relative input use for the national US 
agriculture are driven by substantial scale effects and not inherent bias effects.   
                
2.6 Conclusions 
This article examines the extent to which direct payments to agricultural producers 
have induced changes in output mix and input intensity for national U.S. agriculture. We 
found that direct payments have a statistically insignificant effect of decreasing the 
marginal cost of livestock production and increasing the marginal cost of crop production. 
But what may explain this qualitative result? In the US, the livestock sector is the recipient 
of zero direct payments. Perhaps what our result for the livestock sector implies- in the 
absence of lump sum transfers from the government, the least efficient livestock producers 
exit. Thus lowering the national marginal cost for the sector. In contrast, the crop sector, 
which receives all the Direct Payments may preserve inefficient producers and thus 
increasing the national marginal cost. Such notions are also consistent with generalizations 
of the analytical findings of Chau and de Gorter (2005). Furthermore, farmers in the crop 
sector may use direct payments to continue or expand economically non-viable production 
(Hennessey and Thorne, 2005).  
Our results does show that direct payments do have some unintended statistically 
significant effect of altering input intensities for the national US agriculture. It is worth 
reiterating that these are all relative measures. For example, it is possible that the absolute 
amount of a particular input has increased, but its cost share relative to all other factors of 
production has declined.  Overall input bias suggests that direct payments are labor using 
and capital economizing. While technological innovation has reduced the cost of capital 
inputs for US agriculture in general and contributed towards substitution of labor for 
capital, it seems that direct payments has acted to mildly mitigate this trend. One may 
possibly argue that direct payments are contributing to the sustainability of rural America 
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by keeping labor in farms. However, to what extent such an outcome is aligned with 
broader policy objectives is a matter of open discourse.  
Our study finds substantial scale effect generated by direct payments to farmers, 
particularly in the market of land, which is driving the changes in relative inputs use (pure 
bias). Notice that that scale effects of production is greater than bias effects by order of 
magnitude (one to three). These scale effects are the combined result of induced scale 
adjustments and non-homothetic nature of the underlying technology.  The scale effect of 
livestock production is mildly land using and that of crop production is strongly land 
economizing. Our estimated scale effect of land in crop production (-0.16775), while 
inelastic, is economically very significant. Given credible evidence of capitalization of 
direct payments into land values (Roberts, Kirwan, and Hopkins (2003), and Goodwin, 
Mishra, and Ortalo-Magne (2003)), it makes sense that we observe land economizing 
behavior in the crop sector. At the national level, one would expect inelastic response of 
land share of total cost as output changes due to direct payments.  Furthermore, considering 
that inputs of agricultural production are not allocated by outputs, let alone by program and 
non-program crop, makes our estimated elasticity of scale effect of land in crop production 
to be considerably large. While political will to cut budgets appears to be growing, policy 
makers should consider the spillover implications of these decisions, particularly in terms 
of a land price bubble burst. Land is not only a factor of production in agriculture, but often 
viewed as an asset against which credit is obtained. If commodity payments tied to 
agricultural land is discontinued, it is likely to have sector wide ramification rather than 
just on the recipients.   
Given that we have found statistically insignificant impacts of direct payments in 
altering the marginal cost of both livestock and crop production, what might be driving 
such substantial scale effects of production? It would seem reasonable to believe that for 
direct payments to alter the scale of agricultural production, it has to lower the marginal 
cost of production. This line of reasoning is consistent with notion that agricultural 
producers are strictly profit maximizing agents. However, given past evidence of non-
pecuniary benefits to farming (Key and Roberts (2009) & Hennessey and Thorne (2005)), 
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it is possible that production decisions are not taken solely based on marginal cost pricing. 
In addition, it is likely that the wealth effects due to direct payments might have had a role 
in affecting the relative risk aversion of farmers which resulted in further scale of 
production.    
 The scale effect of crop production is also accompanied with moderate material 
input expansion. Given that direct payments are not tied to material inputs, perhaps our 
result is indicating that the representative national producer is switching to material input 
from land input. This outcome might come as a welcoming news to suppliers of energy, 
fertilizer and line, pesticides, purchased services, and other intermediate inputs, albeit 
marginally. From a policy perspective, the extent to which existing land is farmed through 
intensive use of material inputs (fertilizer, lime, energy, etc.) might be associated with some 
negative externalities such as farm runoff and higher greenhouse gas emissions. While 
evaluating such impact is beyond the scope of this research, we think that it is a promising 
avenue for future work.               
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CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS ON 





The US agricultural commodity support program stemming from the 1996 FAIR 
Act decouples receipt of government payments from market outcome; instead, these 
payments are based on historical acreage and yield of program crops. Higher payment 
levels accrue to operators of large farms simply by design of the program; and over time, 
with production shifting toward operators of large farms (Hoppe, MacDonald, and Korb 
2010; MacDonald 2011), these payments have become increasingly concentrated. For 
example, between 1995 and 2012 the top 10% of the commodity payment recipients were 
paid 77% of commodity payments (Environmental Working Group (EWG)).  
U.S public opinion reveals that taxpayers would rather see their tax dollars go to 
small family farms than to large farms (Ellison, Lusk, and Briggerman 2010). Furthermore, 
interest groups and newspaper editorials have expressed concern about the fairness of 
commodity support programs. Their apprehension- large corporate farms and agribusiness 
partnerships have a competitive advantage over small farms in terms of availability of 
capital, scale economies, and overall profitability. Taxpayer dollars to large farm 
operations are reinvested in capital and land which further increases their competitive 
advantage (EWG 2000). Some are even suggesting a subsidy induced cycle – as large farms 
get even bigger, they become eligible for more government payments, and buy up even 
more small farms (Riedl 2004). Also, high farmland prices price small farmers and 
newcomers out of the market (Bakst and Katz 2013). Such concerns have been reverberated 
in calls to reconsider the distribution of farm subsidies (Becker 2002; Grunwald 2007). As 
such, it becomes important to answer the question: do government payments cause large
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farms to grow more than small farms? Are the differences in marginal effect of government 
payments between large versus small farms substantial and significant? 
Unobserved heterogeneity amongst farm operators makes it difficult to isolate 
causal effects of government payments on farm size. For example, the unobserved 
productivity of a farm operator is likely to affect farm size; with more productive operators 
perhaps managing larger operations, despite being a recipient of government outlays. Also, 
the receipt of government payments is largely based on historical participation in 
commodity support programs. It is likely that transaction costs affected the decision to 
participate in commodity programs. The participation is specific to the individual farm 
operator, as such, one cannot simply ignore the correlation between the farm operator 
specific effects and government payments.  
Unlike past studies that focus on shifts of the conditional mean, this article, using a 
correlated random effects quantile regression model, identifies the impact of government 
payments on the entire conditional distribution of farm size. This approach was recently 
developed (Abrevaya and Dahl 2008 (AD from here onwards); Bache, Dahl, and 
Kristensen 2013 (BDK from here onwards)) and controls for unobserved and correlated 
components. Limited access farm-level panel data set derived from the 1997, 2002, and 
2007 Agricultural Census maintained by USDA-NASS is utilized. Furthermore, this is the 
first article that we are aware of that investigates the effects of government payments on 
individual farm size post 1996- the “decoupled era.”    
 
3.2 Past Literature 
Significant theoretical literature exists (Jovanic 1982; Ericson and Pakes 1992; 
Hopenhayn 1992; Pakes and Ericson 1998) to explain firm size. In these models, the firms 
are uncertain about their own productive efficiency at startup. The longer the firm stays in 
business, the more information they gather. Those that adjust their perception of 
productivity upwards tend to stay in business and expand, while those that revise 
downwards tend to contract and exit. While there are empirical studies (Dunne, Roberts, 
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and Samuelson 1988; Baldwin and Gorecki 1991; Audretsch 1991; Audretsch and 
Mahmood 1995) to confirm these theoretical predictions, these models ignore the dual 
residence–business objectives of most farm households (Ahearn, Yee, and Korb 2005). In 
this regard, Huffman (1991) formulated a theoretically consistent model that combines an 
agricultural household’s decisions- the farm operator allocates time between on-farm work, 
off-farm work, and leisure such that the marginal values of time devoted to the activities 
are equal.         
Apart from the theoretical literature there are a variety of long standing hypothesis 
that consider structural change in agriculture. These models reach different conclusions 
about the influence of public policy on large versus small farms. A few studies are briefly 
discussed to highlight this point, while a detailed account can be found in Harrington and 
Reinsel (1995). Under Cochrane’s (1979) “technology treadmill” hypothesis, commodity 
support programs would allow operators of large farms to bid land away from operators of 
small farms. In Robinson’s (1975) view, government payments are likely to increase net 
returns to operators of small farms, with higher cost structure than operators of large farms, 
and prevent periodic wringing out of smaller operations. Under Kislev and Peterson’s 
(1983) view, government payments will have no effect on optimal farm size. In their model 
land is fixed, and capital and labor are mobile between agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors. Increases in government payments are capitalized into land values and do not affect 
the relative returns to labor and capital nor the capital-land ratio. A salient feature of the 
firm/farm size literature is the heterogeneity of business operations, and the potential of 
government policies to have differential impact at different levels of productivity or 
size/scale.  
There are several econometric studies that investigate the effects of personal 
characteristics of farm operators on business survival and size (Summer and Leiby 1987; 
Hallam 1993; Zepeda 1995; Weiss 1999; Kimhi and Bollman 1999). Other studies 
investigate the effects of government payments on aggregate measures of farm structure 
over time, including national agricultural bankruptcy rate (Shepard and Collins 1982), the 
total number of farms (Tweeten 1993), average farm size (Huffman and Evenson 2001), 
and filing of Chapter 12 bankruptcy rates (Dixon et al, 2004). Only Key and Roberts (2007) 
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examine the effect of government payments on the size of individual farms. They find that 
government payments have a small yet significant positive impact on farm size. However, 
their study is focused on the farm-level response to agricultural payments from 1987 and 
1992, when payments were largely coupled with the market outcomes.  
 
3.3 Data 
The data is derived from the Census of Agriculture longitudinal file maintained by 
USDA-NASS. A subset from census years 1997, 2002, and 2007 is used in this study. This 
dataset allows the researcher to follow farm operators every 5 years. Tables 1 and 2 report 
summary statistics of all the variables used in current research. The dependent variable is 
“land in farm” defined as:  total acres of land owned plus land rented in minus land rented 
out. The variable for government payments1 per acre is in 2007 dollars. This payment 
variable is constructed by dividing total receipt of government outlays by “land in farm”. 
Operator characteristics such as age and indicator variable for primary occupation (“1” if 
non-farmer and “0” otherwise) are used as regressors. The dataset also allows to control 
for land tenure status namely: indicator variables for “full owner” (all land in operation is 
owned), “mixed” (land in operation is owned and rented), and “tenant” (all land in 
operation is rented in). Furthermore, there is information on the type of business 
organization namely: indicator variables for “family2”, “partnership organization”, 
“incorporated organization”, and “other organization3”.  
Level of government payment depends both on the farm size and crop mix, and 
crop mix is an important determinant of farm size. For example, grain farms receive more 
payments and are generally larger than vegetable farms, and the resulting positive 
relationship between farm size and payments is not causal. Thus the sample is confined to 
farms identifying primary4 crop produced as corn-soybean and wheat in all three census 
years (based on NAIC codes). Corn and soybeans are aggregated into one commodity 
because most producers plant these crops on a rotational basis.  Separate regressions are 
estimated for each crop group.  
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3.4 Panel Data Quantile Regression 
Consider a simple setup that consists of exactly two farm size observations for a 
large sample of farm operators. The standard linear panel-data model can be represented 
as: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 (t=1,2; i= 1,2,….n)                                                      (3.1), 
where  𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the farm size outcome of operator i at time t, x denotes a vector of observable 
explanatory variables, 𝛽 is the vector of parameters of interest, c denotes the unobserved 
farm operator specific effect, u is the idiosyncratic error term, and n is the number of 
observations. The standard linear panel setting lends itself to various estimation techniques. 
The “pure” random effects regression, where farm operator individual effect (c) is 
uncorrelated with the covariates (x), is implausible in the current application as discussed 
above. This leaves two remaining estimators, namely, fixed and correlated random effects.  
It is well known that fixed effects regression can be consistently estimated using a 
first differenced regression. However, the conditional expectation is a linear operator 
whereas the conditional quantile is not5, thus making the standard differencing technique 
infeasible for quantile applications (Koenker and Hallock (2000)). Furthermore, if the 
number of waves (t) is small, and the number of observations (i) is large (as in the current 
study), it leads to what is known as the “incidental parameter problem” – where the number 
of parameters needed to control for individual specific effect via dummy variables 
increases with sample size .  
 In order to overcome the incidental parameters issue, Koenker (2004) proposes a 
model for fixed-effects quantile regression where the unobserved fixed effect is a location 
shift on the distribution of the response variable.  That is, it is the same for each percentile.  
However, BDK (2013) have shown in their simulation exercise that Koenker’s (2004) 
approach does not perform very well when (c) has a scale effect - a concern for the current 
application. Furthermore, they show that correlated random effects quantile regression 
models do not suffer from the incidental parameter problem and perform well even when 
omitted items have a scale effect on the response variable. BDK (2013) examine two 
quantile specifications of the correlated random effects estimator. The first was developed 
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by AD (2008), who extend Chamberlain’s (1982; 1984) model to the quantile framework. 
The second specification is the CREM model of their own development, where the mean 
of regressors, assumed to be correlated with the individual specific effect, are included as 
additional regressors. The CREM model has similar performance as AD’s (2008) 
specification, but has the added advantage that it is more parsimonious in terms of the 
number of parameters (and also allows for unbalanced panels). As such the CREM model 
is estimated in this paper.  
 
3.4.1 The CREM Model 
The quantile regression model first proposed in the seminal contribution by 
Koenker and Bassett (1978) can be written as:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜏) + 𝑢𝜏,𝑖, 𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜏), 𝜏 ∈ (0,1)                                                   (3.2), 
where 𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖|𝑥𝑖) denotes the quantile 𝜏 of farm size conditional on the vector of covariates 
(x), and u is a vector of residuals. The time subscript (t) is omitted intentionally to imply 
cross sectional formulation, but will be later included in the exposition on panel method in 




[∑ 𝜏|𝑌𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜏)𝑖:𝑌𝑖≥𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 | + ∑ (1 − 𝜏)|𝑌𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽(𝜏)|𝑖:𝑌𝑖<𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 ]                     (3.3). 
Parameters of the quantile regression approach can be estimated by minimizing the sum of 
weighted absolute deviations using linear programming methods.   
BDK (2013) extend quantile regressions to the correlated random effects panel data 
context. Their CREM model allows the unobserved characteristic (𝑐𝑖) (see (3.1)) to 
partially determine (𝑌𝑖,𝑡) either directly, through 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 ⊂ 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
′  , or both, where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 
(government payments per acre in the current application) is assumed to be correlated with 
𝑐𝑖 . Here 𝑐𝑖 is assumed to be time invariant, so dependence with 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is one-way. BDK 
consider 𝑐𝑖 to be part of the unexplained ranking mechanism and at the same time control 
for effects propagated through 𝑍𝑖,𝑡. This is achieved by assuming that repeated observations 
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of 𝑍𝑖,𝑡  allow for the construction of sufficient covariate(s) 𝑆𝑖, and let the conditional 
quantile function of interest be 𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖,𝑡|𝑋𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑖). For their proposed CREM model  
𝑆𝑖 = ?̅?                                                                                                        (3.4), 
i.e. the t period mean of the observed 𝑍𝑖,𝑡. In this model, S is essentially a weighted average 
and the effect of c through Z is assumed to be the same for each t. This corrects the response 
process for the effect of c through Z, and provides a data-driven mechanism for identifying 
the 𝜏𝑡ℎ  conditional quantile. The approach has the additional elegance that it can be 
estimated by using a standard quantile regression of Y on X and S, with an empirical 
criterion function given by  




𝑖=1 (𝑦𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑠𝑖
′𝜋 −  𝑥𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽).                     (3.5), 
where  𝜌𝜏(𝑢𝜏,𝑖,𝑡) = {
𝜏𝑢𝜏,𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝜏,𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 0
(1 − 𝜏)𝑢𝜏,𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑢𝜏,𝑖,𝑡 < 0
  }.                                      (3.6).  
 
3.5 Econometric Approach 
Land in farm is regressed on operator and operation characters- government 
payments per acre, age, primary occupation, type of business organization, and land tenure 
status. The variable government payments per acre is allowed to be correlated with the time 
invariant farm operator specific heterogeneity (c). Here c can be viewed as unobserved 
farm operator specific productivity or the specific behavior of participating in commodity 
support programs. In order to avoid simultaneity in modelling the relationship between 
land in farm and government payments per acre, previous census year lags of the right hand 
side variables are used. Note that c does not have a time (t) subscript while x does. Thus, 
the dependency between c and x is the same for all time periods and, by definition, lagged 
x is not correlated with current u.  
In order to eliminate differences in farm size that might arise from a change in farm 
operator, data from farms for which the operator aged by five years (length between 
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consecutive waves) was used. The same farm operators are followed in all three waves. 
This sample does not include farms that entered into production or exited after 1997. It is 
plausible that ignoring the exiting farm operators might bias the estimated marginal effect 
of government payments. Government payments might not only impact future farm size 
but also the probability of survival. Key and Roberts (2007) found that government 
payments positively affect the probability of survival; thus ignoring the positive effect of 
payments through the probability of survival can potentially bias the marginal effect 
downwards. The results should be viewed in this light and interpreted as a conservative 
estimate.  
Standard errors were obtained using a block bootstrap routine. Both size outcomes 
of a farm were repeatedly drawn with replacement until the desired sample size was 
reached (85% of the original sample). For a given bootstrap sample, the CREM model was 
estimated. After repeating the process for 1000 times, an empirical variance-covariance 
matrix was constructed using the bootstrapped estimates.     
 
3. 6 Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing is conducted to investigate whether or not the marginal effects 
of covariates are statistically significantly different across different percentiles of the 
conditional farm size distribution. AD’s (2008) extension of the minimum distance 
framework from Buchinsky (1998) for the panel data case is implemented. AD’s (2008) 
framework allows for a much more generalized framework of hypothesis testing, while the 
pairwise testing (which has become a convention in quantile regression) can be viewed as 
a special case. For the current application let p be the different percentiles for which the 
model is estimated (𝜏1, … 𝜏𝑝 are the p percentiles that are estimated). Under the CREM 
model, for a given 𝜏, the individual elements of the parameter vectors 𝛽 and 𝜋 (see (3.5)) 
are referenced by subscripts as 𝛽𝜏 = (𝛽𝜏1, … , 𝛽𝜏𝐿)
′ and  𝜋𝜏 = (𝜋𝜏1, … , 𝜋𝜏𝐾)
′, where L is 
the number of variables in 𝑥𝑖,𝑡
′ , and K ≤ L is the number of different regressors that are 
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allowed to be correlated with farm operator specific effect. Then for a given percentile 𝜏, 
the full parameter vector can be denoted as 
𝛾𝜏 ≡ (𝛽𝜏
′ , 𝜋𝜏
′ )′                                                                                                               (3.9), 
and the stacked parameter vectors for all estimated percentiles can be denoted as 
𝛾 ≡ (𝛾1
′ , … , 𝛾𝑝
′)
′
                                                                                                          (3.10). 
Let 𝛾 denote the estimator for 𝛾, and ?̂? denote the estimated variance-covariance matrix 
obtained by bootstrapping 𝛾.  Under the minimum distance framework, the “restricted” 
parameter estimator (𝛾𝑅) with linear restrictions imposed can be written as:  
𝛾𝑅 = (𝑅′?̂? −1𝑅)
−1
(𝑅′?̂? −1𝛾)                                                                                (3.11) 
where, R is the appropriate restriction matrix. For the purpose of hypothesis testing (i.e. 
𝐻𝑜: 𝛾 = 𝑅𝛾
𝑅), the following minimum distance test statistic has a limiting chi-square 
distribution: 
(𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾𝑅)′?̂? −1(𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾𝑅) →𝐻𝑜
𝑑  𝜒𝑀
2                                                                          (3.12)  
where, M is the degrees of freedom (Buchinsky 1998; AD 2008).  
 
3.7 Results and Discussion 
Estimates for both the First Difference conditional mean estimation and the 
Correlated Random Effects Quantile estimation are reported for comparison sake. Tables 
(3.3-3.4) report parameter estimates at 5% intervals- 𝜏 ∈ (0.05, 0.10, … , 0.95) and the 
associated standard errors. Test statistics from pairwise hypothesis testing are reported in 
tables (3.5-3.6).  Figures (3.1-3.2) present plots of the marginal effect of government 
payments and the 90% confidence interval. Plots of all the other explanatory variables are 
also constructed, but not included in the article.  The dependent variable is “land in farm” 
defined as: total land owned plus land rented in minus land rented out. For the ownership 
variables, the omitted category is “full owner”, while for the type of organization variables, 
the omitted category is “family organization”- the results should be interpreted in this light.  
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3.7.1 Effects of Government Payments on Farm Size 
The first differenced estimates suggest that a $1 increase in payment/acre will 
increase farm size by 0.1457 acres for corn-soy producers (table 3) and by 2.33 acres for 
wheat producers (table 4) (the former statistically significant at the 10% level and the latter 
at 5% level). Quantile regression adds two salient dimensions to the government payment-
farm size nexus. First, the marginal effects of government payments are quantitatively 
larger (smaller), as compared to the first differenced estimates, for operators of bigger 
(smaller) farms. For example, the marginal effect of government payments on farm size is 
0.094, 0.1745, and 0.3406 for the 25th, 60th, and 85th percentile of the farm size distribution 
for corn-soy producers. For wheat producers, the marginal effect of government payments 
on farm size is 1.43, 3.07, and 5.48 for the 25th, 60th, and 85th percentile of the farm size 
distribution. These results imply, for example, that increasing payments / acre by $1 may 
increase the farm size by 0.094 acres and 0.3406 acres for the 25th and 85th percentile of 
corn-soy producers and 1.43 acres and 5.48 acres for the corresponding percentile of wheat 
producers. It should be noted that that increasing payments / acre by $1 is a fairly large 
transfer to the farm operator. Given the construction of the payment/ acre variable, $1 
increase implies about $661-758 increase in payment for the average corn-soy producer 
and $2093-2342 for the average wheat producer. With large farms receiving even more 
government payments, it might make sense that they grow more in operation size as 
compared to their smaller counterpart.  With average US cropland value and cash rent of 
$2500 and $75 respectively in 2007 (USDA-NASS), these lump sum transfers provide 
substantial resources to expand operation size. The dataset does not have enough 
information to disentangle whether the increase in scale of operation occurs by renting in 
or buying more land. Furthermore, the finding that wheat producers are more responsive 
(by an order of one to two) to a $1 increase in payment/acre as compared to corn-soy 
producer can be largely attributed the scale of wheat operation. The average wheat grower 
is has much greater acreage (2093-2342 acres)  in operation as compared to the average 
corn-soy producer (661-758), and thus a $1 increase in payment/acre translates to 
substantially large transfer to the wheat producers.    
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 Second, government payments enable only some farm operators to expand in 
operation size and not others. For corn-soy producers, there are statistically significant 
positive effects of payment on farm size at the 5th, 25th-30th, 60th, and 80th-85th percentile 
of the farm size distribution. For wheat producers, there are statistically significant positive 
effects of payment on farm size at the 20th-25th, 35th, 50th-65th, and 85th percentile of the 
conditional farm size distribution.  
These findings inform the distributional implication of the commodity support 
programs. Both corn-soy and wheat producers at the 85th percentile are almost four times 
more responsive to a dollar increase in commodity payments per acre than the producers 
at the 25th percentile of the farm size distribution.  If one is to define small farms as those 
below the 50th percentile of the conditional farm size distribution, then government 
payments have no impact on a large segment of this population (10th-20th, 35th-45th 
percentiles of corn-soy producers, and 5th-15th , 30th, and 40th-45th percentiles of wheat 
producers). However, these payments do have a substantial impact of operation size of 
farms beyond the 50th percentile of the farm size distribution.   
Pairwise hypothesis testing (tables 5-6) was conducted for the parts of the 
conditional distribution where a statistically significant marginal effect of government 
payments was found. Testing results suggest that for corn-soy producers these estimates 
are not statistically significantly different from each other; while for wheat producers the 
marginal effect of 1.43 at 25th percentile is statistically significantly different (at the 10% 
level) from the marginal effect of 3.49 at the 55th percentile of the farm size distribution.  
 
3.7.2 Effects of Other Factors on Farm Size 
While looking at other covariates, quantile regression reveals trends that are 
consistent across operators of corn-soy and wheat farms. Age is very strongly associated 
with farm size. The first differenced estimates suggest a positive impact whereas quantile 
estimates suggest a negative effect of age on the entire distribution of farm size. These 
seemingly contradictory results can be largely attributed to the manner in which the dataset 
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was constructed6. Quantile estimates suggest that farm operations managed by older 
operators decline in size as compared to those managed by their younger counterparts. For 
corn-soy and wheat producers, the differences in marginal effect between the first, second 
and third quartiles are highly statistically significant, at the 1% level. With an average age 
of over fifty years for farm operators of both corn-soy and wheat farms in the dataset, this 
result is not too surprising. As farm operators get close to or hit retirement, they become 
more likely to sell/lease out their land and thus contract in operation size. This behavior is 
even more likely to be the case for large-scale operation which might be more difficult for 
an aging operator to manage. Farm operators who do not have farming as their primary 
occupation decline in farm operation size. This decline in farm size is substantial for 
operators of larger farms. The differences between the first, second, and third quartiles are 
highly statistically significant at the 1% level for corn-soy and wheat producers.  
Land tenure status is a strong determinant of farm size. Quantile regression results 
suggest that, as compared to the operator who owns all his land, the operator with mixed 
tenure increasingly grows in operation size at all percentiles of the size distribution. The 
differences between the first, second, and third quartiles are highly statistically significant 
at the 1% level for corn-soy and wheat producers. Perhaps having part of the operation 
leased in makes scale adjustments easier, lowers risks associated with asset depreciation, 
provides access to more land without tying up capital in land purchase, and thus promotes 
expansion of the operation.      
As compared to a full owner, the effect of being a tenant moves from being small 
and positive at the lower end of the farm size distribution, to being substantial and negative 
for the higher end of the farm size distribution. Leasing all land in the operation is 
traditionally viewed as the bottom rung of the tenure ladder- where young farmer operators 
would enter into production by leasing land. As they gain experience in managing the 
operation, they are likely to expand out either by buying or leasing in more land. The 
finding of a small positive effect on farm size for a tenant operator at the lower end of the 
farm size is consistent with this view. If the operator of a large farm has no ownership over 
land, then perhaps it is a reflection of a lack of assets which can often times be used as 
collateral to obtain credit. One can possibly interpret the strong negative impact on farm 
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size at the higher end of the distribution to be an outcome of being credit constrained. The 
differences between the first, second, and third quartiles are highly statistically significant 
at the 1% level.   
The type of farm business organization is also a significant determinant of farm 
size: as compared to the family farm, partnership organizations increasingly expand in 
operation size for higher percentile of the size distribution. And the differences between 
the first, second, and third quartiles are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. A 
similar trend can be observed for incorporated farm businesses as well. These results are 
well in line with the popularly held view that large partnerships and incorporated 
agribusiness possess access to capital, scale economies, and vertical contracts that increase 
their profitability and subsequently enable them to expand their operation. The market 
mechanism, left to its own devices, will continue to allocate resources to the best use. To 
the extent that such organizations are most efficient in using scarce resources (particularly 
land), this trend can be expected to continue into the future. The organization type “other” 
has no statistically significant effect on farm size.  It is worth noting that farm size declined 
in the year 2007 as compared to the year 2002 at the lower end of the farm size distribution, 
while it increased for the higher end of the distribution.   
 
3.8 Avenues of Future Research 
Although land tenure status is strongly associated with change in farm size, these 
results should be interpreted with caution. There can be several leasing arrangements – 
fixed / flexible cash rental, share cropping, and free rental. It is likely that farm operators 
classified as “mixed” owner or tenant have either one or several of the aforementioned 
leasing arrangements. There is evidence for average number of rental agreement per farm 
increasing with farm size (Kuethe and Ifft 2013).  The choice(s) of leasing arrangement 
reflects the risk undertaking (weather, price, yield variability etc.) by the individual farm 
operator. It is plausible that the association between land tenure status and farm size is 
capturing the risk-return relation at different percentile of the farm size distribution. 
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However, because the dataset does not provide information on the type of leasing 
arrangement and proportion of land with each category, the driver for change in farm size 
due to land tenure status cannot be ascertained. Future research needs to explore how the 
incentives for adopting a particular land tenure might differ for large versus small farms, 
and the implications for farm size.  
Farm business organization has been found to be an important determinant of farm 
size. It is worth reiterating that farms defined as “family farm” in the census data are likely 
to be sole proprietorships. While those classified as “partnerships” or “incorporated 
businesses” under state law might be family owned businesses, whether it be direct family 
or by marriage. This makes the interpretation of the coefficients associated with the type 
of business organization difficult. It appears that the classification of “family farm” under 
“type of organization” in the Agricultural Census is a misnomer. This suggests a cause for 
revising the existing questionnaire. Furthermore, it is worth investigating the types of 
incentives under different state laws that would encourage farm operators to register as a 
partnership or incorporated business entity.              
 
3.9 Conclusion 
The current research implements recent advancements in correlated random effects 
panel data quantile regression to evaluate how government payments affect different parts 
of the farm size distribution for corn-soy and wheat producers. The methodological 
approach not only allows control for time invariant effects, but also the correlation between 
government payments and operator specific effects. The latter is crucial in measuring 
program effects where participation is non-random.  It contributes to the past literature that 
looked at the mean effects but largely ignored the information contained within the farm 
size distribution. While the average effects of explanatory variables can be informative, at 
times it is more important (in the current debate on farm structure) to understand the effects 
at the extremes of the distribution. Given that the effect of government payments is not 
uniform along the entire distribution of dependent variables (as shown in this research), 
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standard OLS gives an incomplete picture from the point of view of assessing the likely 
policy incidence on individual farms.   
Both corn-soy and wheat producers at the 85th percentile are almost four times more 
responsive, in term of increasing acres operated due to a dollar increase in commodity 
payments per acre, than the producer at the 25th percentile of the farm size distribution. 
With estimated marginal effect of government payments of 0.094, 0.1745, and 0.3406 for 
the 25th, 60th, and 85th percentile of the corn-soy producers, and 1.43, 3.07, and 5.48 for the 
corresponding percentile of wheat producers, these effects are economically significant. 
Furthermore, for wheat producers the marginal effect of 1.43 at 25th percentile is 
statistically different (at the 10% level) from the marginal effect of 3.49 at the 55th 
percentile of the farm size distribution. Given that significant differences are found 
between the response of large versus small farms, even after controlling for unobserved 
and correlated components, policymakers need give due consideration about the 




aThe government payment variable includes all payments from participating in Federal 
farm programs. These include payments from Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), 
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP), Farmable Wetland Programs (FWP), Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Programs (CREP), Direct Payments under the 2002 Farm Bill, 
counter-cyclical payments, loan deficiency payments, market loss payments, national 
market loss payments, non-insured assistance program, Environmental Quality Incentives 
Program, Conservation Security Program, livestock programs, but no insurance payments. 
The payment variable excludes state and local government agricultural program payments 
and Commodity Credit Corporation Loans. It is not possible to disaggregate these 
payments from the Longitudinal File. Antle and Houston (2013) using 2007 Census of 
Agriculture data finds that vast majority of government outlays (61%) goes towards 
commodity subsidies, and conservation programs accounted for only about 13%. 2007 was 
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a period of high commodity prices which lead to low price support payments. However, 
during the timeframe of the payment data used in this article (1997 and 2002), commodity 
prices were relatively lower and it is likely that commodity subsidies accounted for a lion’s 
share of total government payment outlays. Once the farm operator enrolls land into 
conservation program, they are locked in for fixed contract period. It is not obvious whether 
conservation program dollars are used to buy or lease in more land, or they leave farm 
operation size unaffected.  
1Indicator variables for business organization needs to in interpreted with caution. It is 
possible that businesses registered as either partnership or incorporated organization under 
state law are family businesses. 
2This includes estate or trust, prison farm, grazing association, American Indian Reserves, 
etc. Less than 0.5% of the samples belongs to this category.  
3NAIC for corn, soybeans, or wheat is assigned if any one of the crop accounts for at least 
50% of sales.  
4𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖,2 − 𝑌𝑖,1|𝑥𝑖) ≠ 𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖,2|𝑥𝑖) − 𝑄𝜏(𝑌𝑖,1|𝑥𝑖) , where 𝑄𝜏(. |. ) denotes the 𝜏
𝑡ℎ conditional 
quantile function for 𝜏 ∈ (0,1). In general, conditional quantile functions are 
complicated non-linear expressions.  
5 In order to eliminate differences in farm size which might arise from changes in operator, 
those who aged by 5 years between consecutive waves are followed. This implies the first 
differenced age variable is a vector of 5’s. Given farms increased in size on average for the 
sample, the first differenced age variable is picking up the increase in average farm size 
rather than the actual effect of aging farm operator. Quantile estimates bypasses the first 
difference transformation and relates the variation in the age variable on the right hand side 
to the variation in the dependent variable. Qualitative discrepancies between conditional 
mean estimates and the quantile estimates can be reconciled by realizing that the 
conditional mean estimates hold for the mean of the data by relating changes in the 
dependent variable to the change in the independent variable. To the extent that the average 
changes in the regressor and the dependent variable moves in the same direction, one ought 
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CHAPTER 4: SIZE AND POWER OF MINIMUM DISTANCE ESTIMATOR 





Several recent papers have proposed correlated random effects estimators for 
quantile regression in the context of panel data where individual specific effects may be 
correlated with the regressors (Abrevaya and Dahl 2008 (AD); Bache, Dahl, and Kristensen 
2013). In contrast to standard mean regression panel models with correlated individual 
effects, the quantile regression function is not linear, and standard differencing techniques 
do not easily apply. AD modeled unobserved heterogeneity by allowing individual specific 
effects to be related to a set of covariates for a balanced panel. Bache, Dahl, and Kristensen 
(2013) developed a special case of AD’s specification, CREM model, which includes the 
mean(s) of covariate(s), assumed to be correlated with the individual specific effects, as 
additional regressors. On top of being more parsimonious in parameters, the CREM model 
allows for an unbalanced panel. Furthermore, Bache, Dahl, and Kristensen (2013) conduct 
simulation exercises to compare the finite sample performance for a battery of panel 
estimators. They find that correlated random effects model do no suffer from the incidental 
parameter problem, and that AD’s  estimator and their proposed CREM model have 
comparable performance in terms of close to unbiasedness and diminishing variance.  
These papers mark important contributions as extensions of well-known quantile 
estimators (e.g., Koenker and Bassett 1978), and are valuable tools for applied researchers 
interested in developing a distributional-type analysis using observational data. These 
estimators are simple to implement using a variety of off-the-shelf software, and are 
applicable in a variety of economic and social sciences contexts. Recent applications of
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these estimators investigate the effect of smoking on infant birth weight (Abrevaya and 
Dahl 2008), effects of decentralization of wage bargaining from sector to firm level on 
wages and wage dispersion (Dahl, Maire and Munch 2013), and the effects of agricultural 
subsidies on farm size (Haque 2014).  
In empirical research, it is imperative to test whether the slope coefficients differ 
significantly across quantiles. Statistical evidence that the quantile parameters are different 
provides further justification for the general quantile approach, in addition to sound 
economic reasoning. Such tests may include, for instance, a full-scale test of the null 
hypothesis that all of the parameters are the same across quantiles (𝛽𝜏 = 𝛽−𝜏  ∀ 𝜏 ∈Τ), or 
in the case of specific applications, perhaps a pairwise test of the null hypothesis that two 
particular parameters are the same (𝛽𝜏1 = 𝛽𝜏2). Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) extend the 
Buchinsky (1998) minimum distance testing framework into the correlated random effects 
quantile regression setting (detailed in the following section). The test is shown to have a 
chi-squared limiting distribution (Buchinsky 1998). 
 With applications of the correlated random effects quantile regressions model for 
panel data gaining popularity among applied researchers, it is important to understand how 
this hypothesis testing framework performs in finite samples. Researchers in different 
applied areas may have access to samples of considerably different sizes, and it is not 
necessarily clear how this proposed test will perform across a broad spectrum of available 
data. Here, we conduct a variety of Monte Carlo simulations to assess the size and power 
of the test. Specifically, we consider samples of variable sizes, spanning panels of variable 
time horizons, to provide applied researchers with a detailed understanding of the expected 
performance of this test in a variety of settings likely to be encountered in practice. 
 
4.2 Testing Procedure 
Here, we follow Abrevaya and Dahl (2008) and outline the proposed test. Our 
outline considers the general case of parameter restrictions; it is straightforward to modify 
this test given more specific restrictions (e.g., pairwise restrictions). Given a set of 
restrictions, the restricted parameter estimator is defined as the solution  
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 𝛾𝑅 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝛾𝑅(𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾
𝑅)′ ?̂? −1 (𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾𝑅)     (4.1) 
where 𝛾 denotes the CREM estimator for 𝛾, ?̂? is the estimated variance-covariance, and R 
is an appropriate restriction matrix. Given a set of linear restrictions, the restricted 
parameter estimator 𝛾𝑅 can be written:   
 𝛾𝑅 = (𝑅′?̂? −1𝑅)
−1
(𝑅′?̂? −1𝛾).                                                  (4.2) ( 
We define the null hypothesis to be 𝐻𝑜: 𝛾 = 𝑅𝛾
𝑅, and obtain the following test 
statistic: 
 𝑇 =  (𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾𝑅)′?̂? −1(𝛾 − 𝑅𝛾𝑅) →𝐻𝑜
𝑑  𝜒𝑀
2 .                                (4.3) ( 
that has a limiting chi-square distribution with M degrees of freedom (Buchinsky 1998; 
Abrevaya and Dahl 2008).  
 
4.3 Monte Carlo Design 
To assess the finite sample performance of this test statistic, we adopt a slightly 
modified version of the data generating process deployed by Bache, Dahl and Kristensen 
(2013) that explicitly incorporates the degree of heteroskedasticity to allow 𝛽(𝜏) to vary 
by 𝜏. In particular, the data generating mechanism is as follows: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 10 − 3𝑥1𝑖𝑡 +  𝑥2𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡                                            (4.4) ( 
such that  
 𝜂𝑖𝑡 = (1 + 𝜃𝑥1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖)𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                        (4.5) ( 
In (4.4) and (4.55), 𝑐𝑖 represents the unobserved individual specific effect that 
equals zero with probability 0.5 and is standard normal distributed otherwise, and 
𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0,1). The variable 𝑥1𝑖𝑡  represents an effect variable that is correlated with 𝑐𝑖 and 





0.25 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖 > 0.2 
0.75 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑖 < −0.2 
0.5 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.
                                                                  (4.6) 
( 
The variable 𝑥2𝑖𝑡 represents all other observable variables, and is the sum of five 
uniform random variables on the interval (-0.5, 0.5).  𝜃 ≥ 0 controls the degree of 
heteroskedasticity. If 𝜃 = 0, then the ?̂?(𝜏) associated with 𝑥1𝑖𝑡  is constant, but for 𝜃 ≠ 0, 
?̂?(𝜏) varies with 𝜏. 𝛾 ∈ (0,1) controls whether 𝑐𝑖 has scale effect in addition to a location 
effect, i.e. it allows the effect of 𝑐𝑖 to vary with 𝜏. In our design, the size and power of the 
test are assessed when 𝜃 = 0 and 𝜃 > 0, respectively. 
 In our experiments, we consider variable sample sizes of 𝑛 ∈
{50,100,200,400,800} with time dimensions 𝑇 ∈ {2,7}. We set the parameter 𝛾 = 1, and 
assess size and power over the range 𝜃 ∈ {0,0.1,0.2, … ,1}. We estimate the variance-
covariance matrix from the CREM model using a block bootstrap with 𝐵 = 399 
replications, and for each setup, consider 𝑀 = 1000 Monte Carlo replications. We explore 
a quantile regression setting, in which our null hypothesis is: 𝐻𝑜: ?̂?(0.25) = ?̂?(0.5) =




Tables 4.1 and 4.2 and the corresponding plots Figure 4.1 and 4.2 present the results 
for time dimensions 𝑇 ∈ {2,7}. For the MD framework of hypothesis testing to have 
desirable size, one would ideally expect it to reject the null hypothesis approximately 5% 
of the time when it is true ( 𝜃 = 0). The results provide some interesting consideration in 
this regard. For = 0 , the test seems to be under sized for small to moderate sample sizes. 
For examples, for n between 50 to 400 the rejection rate is less than 5% for both time 
dimensions. For n=800, the size is 5.5% at t=2 versus 3.8% at t=7. This suggests that the 
test does not have the correct size.  
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Furthermore, one would expect the power of the test (rejection rate of the null when 
it is false) should increase as more heteroskedasticity is introduced i.e. 𝜃 > 0 and or the 
sample size increases. This test displays low power in small samples, particularly for t=2. 
For example, at t=2, in smaller samples (n=50, 100,200), the rejection rate is barely 40% 
for a moderate level of heteroskedasticity (𝜃 = 0.5). However, one can observe the power 
curves shifting upwards for larger samples. Thus the test does display the desirable power 
property asymptotically. For example, at t=2 and n=800, the rejection rate is almost 95% 
for 𝜃 = 0.5. We observe that for higher time dimensions (t=7), the power curves are 
significantly steeper- the power property improves significantly.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
Finite sample properties of the MD framework of hypothesis testing for quantile 
regressions was evaluated in this study. We find mixed results. The test does not have the 
right size in finite samples- it is under sized. Furthermore, the size property of the test does 
not seem to improve for larger sample sizes. We find low power, particularly for small 
samples and time dimensions. This particular finding perhaps has significant ramification 
for applied researchers. One ought to be cautious about failing to reject the null hypothesis 
in the presence of heteroskedasticity, particularly in small samples. However, the power 
property does seem to improve for larger sample sizes and time dimensions.     
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This dissertation contributes to the “decoupled” payments debate in two salient 
manner. First, it econometrically explores the role of decoupled payments in altering the 
underlying production technology of national US agriculture. Second, it addresses the 
question about the fairness of disbursement and subsequent outcome in terms of farm size.  
There is a third dimension of contribution, complementary to the second objective, where 
the finite sample properties of the Minimum Distance framework of testing equality of 
slope coefficients, utilized in the addressing the second objective, is investigated. Overall 
the findings suggest that the era of “decoupled” payments are was far from being 
decoupled.  
At the national level, the findings suggest that “decoupled” payments were mildly 
labor using and capital saving. Such findings suggest that farm safety net programs keep 
labor in agriculture, which perhaps would have otherwise been reallocated to non-
agricultural sector. Whether maintaining a more vibrant rural community with taxpayer 
dollars is a desirable or not is moot point. The Farm Bill does not presuppose any such 
objective. The results do find substantial land saving behavior due to scale effect of crop 
production. Such an outcome is a perhaps a result of landowners capturing the “decoupled” 
payment dollars through higher land rents.  
While it is well documented that “decoupled” payments disproportionately accrue 
to large farming operations simply by design, whether they lead to disproportionate 
outcome has been a contentious issue. This dissertation addresses this concern in terms of 
the effect on farm size. The results show that both corn-soy and wheat producers at the 
85th percentile are almost four times more responsive, in term of increasing acres operated 
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due to a dollar increase in commodity payments per acre, than the producer at the 25th 
percentile of the farm size distribution.  Given that significant differences are found 
between the responses of large versus small farms, even after controlling for unobserved 
and correlated components, it is alarming to say the least. In agriculture, where land plays 
the dual role as a primary factor of production and as an asset, such a policy not only effects 
the competitive landscape but also the economic wellbeing of the small farmers. 
Policymakers need give due consideration about the distributional impacts of commodity 
program payments.      
  Finally this dissertation addresses the finite sample properties of the Minimum 
Distance (MD) estimator framework of testing equality of slopes for quantile regressions. 
Results suggest that the test is under sized and has low power in small samples. However, 
with larger samples, while the power improves, the test still does not display proper size. 
Applied econometricians utilizing such a framework of hypothesis testing should exercise 






























In (2.4) we assume that farmers are price takers in the input market. We use 














𝑖=1 + 𝜃𝑟𝑙𝑛𝑧 + 𝜏𝑟𝑡. We adopt a measure of output bias, 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄
, as shown in (2.5). 
This measure of output bias can be interpreted in the following manner: 
𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 > 0 implies bias towards output j; 
𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 = 0 implies neutral technical change; and  
𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄 < 0 implies biased towards output i. 
In order to derive an expression for 𝐵𝑖,𝑗
𝑄
, an expression for the elasticity of 
government payments with respect to of the marginal cost for output i is needed. We carry 















)                                                                                         (A1).   
We then differentiate logarithm of (A1) with respect to logarithm of farm payments 
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= 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑗
2
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑗 + ∑ 𝜌𝑖,𝑟
4
𝑟=1 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑟 + 𝜆𝑖𝑙𝑛𝑧 + 𝜔𝑡                                          
(A3). 
 We then differentiate logarithm of (A3) with respect to logarithm of government payment 
to obtain the following:







                                                                                                                              (A4). 
We then combine (A2) and (A4) to get an expression for the government payment elasticity 
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                                                                                                                        (A6). 
Note that we can make the above simplification because  
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑖
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑧
= 0, since qi and z are treated 
as exogenous in (2.4).   
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Appendix B 
Table 2.1: Variable Summary Statistics 1948-2011 
Variable name                            Mean                  Std. Dev            Min.               Max.          
Total cost1                                  153563.19        97753.83     44674.24        427115                                                                              
Revenue share of Livestock       0.5757        0.1248     0.3497            0.8557                                                                 
Revenue share of Crops             0.8181        0.2212     0.4892            1.1687                                                                                  
Quantity index of Livestock      0.7680        0.1655     0.4808            1.0385                                                                                      
Quantity index of crops             0.6840        0.2254     0.3455            1.0426                                                                          
Price of labor                             0.3766        0.3457     0.0409            1.2199                                                                    
Price of capital                           0.6347                 0.4322     0.1184            1.3264                                                                                                               
Price of land                               0.5593        0.4392     0.1304            2.5635                                                                   
Price of materials                       0.6096        0.3481     0.2158            1.5375                                                           
Cost share of labor                     0.1215        0.0501     0.0487            0.2317                                                                
Cost share of capital                  0.0996        0.0239     0.0625            0.1435                                                            
Cost share of land                      0.1378        0.0374     0.0467            0.2618                                                          
Cost share of materials               0.6410        0.0632     0.5110            0.7476                                                                
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Table 2.2: Parameter Estimates of the Translog Cost function for US Agricultural Production  
Parameter         Coefficient              Parameter         Coefficient  
𝛼0                    12.956***                𝛾1,1                    0.032684                                     
                         (0.30349)                                          (0.02857)  
𝛼𝐿𝑆            0.07526                   𝛾1,2                    -0.03373**                                                                                     
                         (0.05041)                                          (0.01583)                                                     
𝛼𝐶𝑅            0.01841                   𝛾1,3                   0.02697**                                                                    
                         (0.02381)                                          (0.01247)                                                            
𝛿𝐿𝑆,𝐿𝑆            0.63803***             𝛾1,4                   -0.06407*** 
                         (0.26507)                                          (0.00713)                                
𝛿𝐿𝑆,𝐶𝑅            -0.02812                  𝛾2,2                   0.08404***                     
                         (0.10881)                                          (0.00316)                            
𝛿𝐶𝑅,𝐶𝑅            -0.36991***            𝛾2,3                   -0.01130*** 
                         (0.13120)                                          (0.00082)                          
𝛽1            0.19618***             𝛾2,4                   -0.05312***                     
                         (0.00953)                                          (0.00393) 
𝛽2            0.08658***             𝛾3,3                   0.09798***  
                         (0.00522)                                          (0.00433) 
𝛽3            0.14312***             𝛾3,4                    -0.06482*** 
                         (0.00248)                                          (0.00412)                                            
𝛽4            0.57411***             𝛾4,4                    0.18201***                 
                         (0.01098)                                          (0.01001) 
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Table 2.2 Continued… 
Parameter         Coefficient               Parameter        Coefficient  
 
𝜌𝐿𝑆,1                 0.03268                    𝜙                      0.00224***          
                         (0.02857)                                          (0.00081)                   
𝜌𝐿𝑆,2                  -0.03373**              𝜆𝐿𝑆                    -0.0018562                                      
                         (0.01583)                                           (0.00374)                   
𝜌𝐿𝑆,3                  0.02697**               𝜆𝐶𝑅                   0.00046 
                         (0.01247)                                          (0.00288)           
𝜌𝐿𝑆,4                  -0.02593**              𝜃1                     0.00051                
                         (0.03456)                                          (0.00045)                                    
𝜌𝐶𝑅,1                 -0.01110                  𝜃2                     -0.00054***      
                         (0.01474)                                          (0.00022)        
𝜌𝐶𝑅,2                 0.011200                 𝜃3                      -0.00009          
                         (0.00702)                                          (0.00038)                                                                    
𝜌𝐶𝑅,3                 -0.04531***             𝜃4                     0.00011                                       
                         (0.01234)                                          (0.00058)                           
𝜌𝐶𝑅,4                 0.04521**                𝜇                      -0.00875**                                    
                         (0.01887)                                          (0.00434)                                       
𝜑                      0.00935***              𝜎                      0.00017***                                         
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Table 2.2 Continued… 
Parameter        Coefficient                
 
𝜏1                      -0.00063               
                         (0.00051)                                           
𝜏2                     0.00044*                
                         (0.00027)                                               
𝜏3                     0.00097***               
                         (0.00029)                                           
𝜏4                     -0.00078             
                         (0.00057) 
                                            
𝜔𝐿𝑆                   -0.00620*                                                                                                                
                         (0.00373) 
𝜔𝐶𝑅                  0.00789*** 
                         (0.00271) 
 𝜅                      -0.00003 
                         (0.00011)                                       
                                   
R                                0.98137*** 
                                       (0.00449)                                                   
Note: Standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. Parameter subscript LS and CR denotes livestock and crops, whereas 
subscript 1, 2, 3, and 4 denotes labor, capital, land, materials.  
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Table 2.3: Output Bias 
          MCLivestoick                                                                 MCCrop                                                                        𝐵𝐿𝑆,𝐶𝑅
𝑄
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Table 2.4: 90% Confidence Intervals for Output Bias  
 
  MCLivestock                                                                             MCCrop                                                                      𝐵𝐿𝑆,𝐶𝑅
𝑄
   
  Lower                 Upper                                                Lower                       Upper                                           Lower                       Upper 








Table 2.5: Input Bias  
Input              Bias                  Scale Effect of LS            Scale Effect of CR               Pure Bias  
Labor          0.00235**                 0.01870                               -0.02598                      0.00963 
Capital        -0.00580***              -0.04503                             0.06124                      -0.02201 
Land           -0.00062                    0.02443**                          -0.16775*                    0.14269* 
Materials     0.00020                    -0.00584                              0.0415**                    -0.03550* 































Table 2.6: 90% Confidence Intervals for Input Bias  
                             Bias                  Scale Effect of LS        Scale Effect of CR           Pure Bias 
Input         Lower         Upper         Lower        Upper         Lower      Upper         Lower     Upper 
Labor       0.00042      0.00498     -0.07089    0.00106      -0.00220  0.37042      -0.0178    0.32548 
Capital     -0.00754     -0.00159    -0.00192   0.15303      -0.44615   0.00542    -0.64174   0.02189 
Land         -0.00723     0.00433     -0.11377   -0.00261      0.02579   2.24           0.01988    2.64 























Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Surviving Corn-Soy Producers- Mean (Standard Deviation) 1997-2007 
 1997 2002 2007 
LIF 667.71 745.34 757.88 
 (794.32) (905.77) (980.18) 
GovPay 9333.50 10900.90 13438.85 
 (11289.20) (17739.64) (18216.39) 
GovPay/acre 14.33 14.41 19.59 
 (13.05) (15.47) (69.01) 
Age 50.03 55.03 60.03 
 (11.13) (11.13) (11.13) 
Occup_Nonfarm 0.2869 0.1653 0.2393 
 (0.4523) (0.3714) (0.4267) 
Tenure- mixed 0.6200 0.6159 0.6151 
 (0.4854) (0.4864) (0.4866) 
Tenure-tenant 0.1646 0.1242 0.1072 
 (0.3709) (0.3298) (0.3094) 
Tenure-full owner 0.2154 0.2600 0.2777 
 (0.4111) (0.4386) (0.4479) 
Org-Partner 0.0528 0.0470 0.0573 
 (0.2237) (0.2117) (0.2324) 
Org-Incorp 0.0418 0.0454 0.0520 
 (0.2001) (0.2081) (0.2221) 
Org-Other 0.0022 0.0022 0.0048 
 (0.0473) (0.0473) (0.0693) 
Org-Family 0.9032 0.9054 0.8859 
 (0.2958) (0.2927) (0.3180) 









Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for Surviving Wheat Producers- Mean (Standard Deviation) 1997-2007 
 1997 2002 2007 
LIF 2093.35 2265.41 2342.69 
 (2282.08) (2488.05) (2790.80) 
GovPay 17466.51 18306.03 25260.06 
 (24535.66) (24853.22) (30348.73) 
GovPay/acre 9.49 8.62 12.71 
 (7.20) (8.33) (13.43) 
Age 51.91 56.91 61.91 
 (11.44) (11.44) (11.44) 
Nonfarmer 0.1637 0.0982 0.1627 
 (0.3700) (0.2976) (0.3691) 
Tenure- mixed 0.6811 0.6758 0.6652 
 (0.4661) (0.4681) (0.4720) 
Tenure-tenant 0.1553 0.1136 0.0992 
 (0.3622) (0.3174) (0.2990) 
Tenure-full owner 0.1637 0.2106 0.2356 
 (0.3700) (0.4078) (0.4244) 
 Org-Partner 0.0799 0.0776 0.0938 
 (0.2711) (0.2676) (0.2915) 
 Org-Incorp 0.1037 0.1054 0.1213 
 (0.3049) (0.3071) (0.3265) 
 Org-Other 0.0030 0.0030 0.0047 
 (0.0545) (0.0545) (0.0685) 
 Org-Family 0.8135 0.8140 0.7803 
 (0.3896) (0.3892) (0.4141) 








Table 3.3: Panel Data Estimation Results (𝛽(𝜏)), for Farm Operators Classified as Producing Corn and Soy as the Major Crop. The Dependent Variable 
is Land in Farm 
  First Diff 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 
GovPay/acre  0.1457* 0.1102*
** 
0.0783 0.0376 0.0417 0.0940* 0.0933* 0.0750 0.0800 0.0744 0.0702 
 (0.0812) (0.0385) (0.0498) (0.0465) (0.0404) (0.0559) (0.0549) (0.0641) (0.0725) (0.0845) (0.096) 
Age                                 1.9*** -2.3*** -3.5*** -4.6*** -5.7*** -6.6*** -7.6*** -8.5*** -9.6*** -10.6*** -11.7*** 
 (0.5867) (0.1038) (0.1279) (0.1286) (0.1460) (0.1463) (0.1598) (0.1762) (0.2168) (0.2154) (0.2708) 
Nonfarmer -3.9 -
90.9*** 
-129.3*** -161.9*** -195.5*** -225.6*** -255.6*** -283.9*** -313.2*** -342.6*** -373.6*** 
 (6.9) (2.7) (3.1) (3.4) (3.5) (3.4) (3.9) (3.9) (4.5) (4.8) (5.6) 
Tenure-mixed -28.9*** 66.6*** 97.3*** 120.79*** 143.4*** 163.9*** 181.3*** 199.5*** 215.8*** 228.2*** 244.2*** 
 (8.5) (2.1) (2.4) (2.4) (2.7) (3.2) (3.3) (3.3) (4.1) (4.4) (5.1) 
Tenure-tenant -39.9*** 23.7*** 32.6*** 40.2*** 44.1*** 48.6*** 53.0*** 54.8*** 55.4*** 51.5*** 49.3*** 
 (11.8) (3.2) (2.9) (3.5) (3.5) (3.7) (4.0) (4.1) (5.1) (5.4) (5.9) 
Org-Partner -32.4** 22.6*** 46.8*** 57.0*** 80.3*** 101.4*** 125.2*** 143.7*** 176.5*** 219.4*** 270.2*** 
 (13.3) (5.8) (5.9) (6.3) (8.3) (8.1) (10.4) (10.1) (15.7) (18.8) (29.2) 
Org-Incorp -25.1 129.4**
* 
201.9*** 259.6*** 305.1*** 355.9*** 396.3*** 435.9*** 472.5*** 519.2*** 562.9*** 




-35.71** -43.24* -28.27 -23.71 -31.89 -45.13 -38.14 -26.47 -23.0 
 (57.12) ( 5.89) (17.70) (23.70) (29.84) (24.40) (23.23) (29.49) (36.17) (36.19) (36.41) 
Year 2007 - -
19.13**
* 
-19.34*** -20.14*** -21.53*** -20.34*** -16.37*** -13.20*** -9.17*** -7.24*** -3.46 
  - (1.69) (1.73) (1.91) (1.84) (1.96) (1.97) (2.15) (2.63) (2.43) (2.75) 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observations: 29369 pairs. ‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% 









Table 3.3 Continued:  
  55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95%          
GovPay/acre  0.1055 0.1745* 0.1407 0.0693 0.0854 0.2310* 0.3406* 0.2136 0.3214 
 (0.0929) (0.1041) (0.0975) (0.1131) (0.1122) (0.1246) (0.1773) (0.1991) (0.3070) 
Age -12.8*** -13.8*** -15.0*** -16.5*** -17.9*** -19.6*** -21.6*** -24.2*** -27.8*** 
 (0.2781) (0.3324) (0.3692) (0.4588) (0.4903) (0.6062) (0.8518) (0.9525) (1.3) 
Nonfarm -402.9*** -438.4*** -478.4*** -523.5*** -577.7*** -659.2*** -770.9*** -961.5*** -1317.5*** 
 (5.7) (6.1) (7.2) (7.8) (8.8) (10.5) (15.7) (20.5) (32.5) 
Tenure-mixed 261.9*** 276.7*** 293.0*** 310.1*** 327.0*** 335.0*** 340.7*** 324.3*** 327.9*** 
 (5.2) (5.9) (7.7) (8.1) (9.9) (11.7) (17.4) (21.4) (31.3) 
Tenure-tenant 45.0*** 41.3*** 36.6*** 29.5*** 23.2** 1.1 -40.2** -90.2*** -182.9*** 
 (7.1) (7.9) (8.9) (10.3) (11.4) (13.0) (16.5) (22.2) (31.0) 
Org-Partner 371.7*** 457.2*** 562.8*** 684.2*** 822.2*** 969.7*** 1165.8*** 1427.3*** 1833.2*** 
 (27.4) (36.7) (39.2) (42.6) (53.6) (50.3) (73.7) (92.8) (152.3) 
Org-Incorp 613.6*** 670.8*** 735.5*** 793.9*** 867.6*** 934.8*** 983.3*** 1073.2*** 1200.3*** 
 (30.7) (31.3) (33.7) (31.4) (43.9) (36.5) (49.4) (62.6) (84.8) 
Org-Other -32.8 14.9 -6.9 -23.2 -22.2 -46.7 -12.5 150.1 418. 
 (44.6) (39.8) (34.9) (36.6) (37.9) (56.9) (140.7) (265.9) (425.5) 
Year 2007 2.0 6.8** 11.2*** 21.8*** 23.6*** 31.4*** 43.2*** 53.7*** 77.7*** 
  (2.8) (3.3) (3.6) (3.7) (4.5) (5.3) (7.6) (8.9) (16.5) 
          
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observations: 29369 pairs. ‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% 









Table 3.4: Panel Data Estimation Results (𝛽(𝜏)), for Farm Operators Classified as Producing Wheat as the Major Crop. The Dependent Variable is Land 
in Farm 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observations: 4032 pairs. ‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% 
level; ‘***’: significant at the 1% level. 
  First 
Diff 
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% 
GovPay/acre  2.3 ** 0.7846 0.5499 1.1 1.6** 1.4** 1.4 2.0* 1.5 1.6 3.1*** 
 (1.1) (0.6023) (0.5973) (0.7008) (0.6840) (0.7423) (0.9020) (1.1) (0.99) (1.1) (1.1) 
Age 15.9*** -8.2*** -12.1*** -15.6*** -19.2*** -22.4*** -24.9*** -27.4*** -29.8*** -32.5*** -34.3*** 
 (3.93) (1.02) (1.03) (1.12) (1.16) (1.23) (1.51) (1.61) (1.89) (1.92) (1.83) 
Nonfarmer 56.5 -311.4*** -423.9*** -517.5*** -622.3*** -685.9*** -779.1*** -871.9*** -967.6*** -32.5 -1104.4*** 
 (55.9) (25.8) (25.3) (29.4) (26.4) (29.2) (29.5) (29.4) (36.6) (41.7) (44.7) 
Tenure-mixed -
144.9** 
205.5*** 255.5*** 317.2*** 334.4*** 355.3*** 393.3*** 428.0*** 454.2*** 462.3*** 516.1*** 
 (57.3) (20.3) (21.5) (21.5) (22.5) (27.2) (29.5) (37.5) (40.6) (41.2) (41.2) 
Tenure-tenant 34.8 18.6 4.1 11.5 -18.2 -4.5 -26.3 -35.1 -17.2 -63.4 -71.1 
 (82.5) (28.6) (30.8) (37.6) (38.3) (47.4) (42.9) (53.6) (57.4) (55.0) (54.9) 
Org-Partner 11.7 118.6*** 208.6*** 295.8*** 427.5*** 508.5*** 608.7*** 702.2*** 847.4*** 983.0*** 1163.8*** 
 (82.9) (37.1) (44.9) (64.9) (74.0) (80.0) (85.6) (108.4) (118.6) (140.5) (155.5) 
Org-Incorp 217.0** 523.5*** 679.1*** 828.1*** 1008.7*** 1048.99*** 1056.1*** 1104.7*** 1136.6*** 1176.4*** 1248.5*** 
 (102.3) (84.7) (72.7) (99.3) (75.6) (53.9) (71.7) (72.9) (77.1) (79.9) (108.8) 
Org-Other -160.6 -220.2*** -228.4** -318.9* -341.5* -236.1 -322. 6** -310.6* -420.9*** -485.2*** -492.9** 
 (322.1) (59.5) (93.4) (162.7) (188.7) (174.9) (155.1) (159.3) (156.4) (166.6) (206.4) 
Year 2007 - -51.1*** -31.5** -27.4** -6.4 7.6 11.6 19.1 44.5** 58.1** 84.8*** 








Table 3.4 Continued: 
  55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 
GovPay/acre  3.5*** 3.1** 2.8* 1.9 1.9 3.8 5.5* 3.1 2.4 
 (1.2) (1.3) (1.7) (1.8) (2.0) (2.4) (2.9) (4.3) (7.8) 
Age -36.8*** -38.0*** -40.0*** -43.9*** -48.8*** -55.4*** -60.2*** -62.6*** -78.9*** 




-1229.4*** -1327.1*** -1436.7*** -1530.9*** -1634.3*** -1893.5*** -2171.0*** -2728.5*** 
 (49.0) (54.9) (64.7) (72.6) (81.8) (103.1) (116.4) (130.1) (211.1) 
Tenure-mixed 541.0*** 576.5*** 657.7*** 674.9*** 708.7*** 661.7*** 613.6*** 509.1*** 365.4* 
 (43.1) (49.1) (59.9) (75.2) (83.5) (107.2) (129.7) (170.2) (219.6) 
Tenure-tenant -134.7** -157.3** -161.4** -252.1*** -280.3*** -430.5*** -494.8*** -579.8*** -1009.8*** 
 (57.6) (65.2) (73.0) (89.4) (92.7) (127.9) (150.0) (192.5) (255.5) 
Org-Partner 1342.0**
* 
1669.3*** 2093.8*** 2521.9*** 3024.1*** 3334.9*** 4375.7*** 5802.7*** 6659.3*** 
 (183.3) (259.9) (310.4) (309.1) (311.2) (462.3) (571.5) (697.5) (622.8) 
Org-Incorp 1370.4**
* 
1450.4*** 1515.6*** 1554.1*** 1603.8*** 1849.8*** 2029.9*** 2297.9*** 3068.3*** 
 (95.9) (104.3) (112.3) (127.2) (163.5) (212.8) (250.5) (267.8) (559.9) 
Org-Other -557.9** -654.5** -728.3 -882.2 -132.6 -160.9 -430.4 -597.1 -1064.8 
 (273.2) (374.3) (515.0) (549.3) (575.4) (572.9) (565.6) (668.9) (1075.5) 
Year 2007 114.3*** 140.3*** 126.9*** 131.9*** 148.2*** 221.2*** 260.3*** 294.3*** 587.5*** 
  (24.1) (26.4) (30.7) (36.5) (37.2) (47.9) (54.6) (73.8) (145.) 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. Number of observations: 4032 pairs. ‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% 








Table 3.5: 𝜒2 Statistics for Pairwise Hypothesis Testing on Statistically Significant Marginal Effect Estimates 𝛽(𝜏), for 
Farm Operators Classified as Producing Corn and Soybeans as the Major Crop  
Note: The critical values for 𝜒2 statistic with “1” degree of freedom are 2.71, 3.84, and 6.64 for significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively.   ‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% level; ‘***’: significant at the 1% 
level.† denotes that either one or both of the marginal effect estimates pair were statistically insignificant at the 10% 
level, and thus pairwise hypothesis testing was not conducted.   
GovPay/acre  5% vs. 25% 5% vs. 30% 5% vs. 60% 5% vs. 80% 5% vs. 85% 25% vs. 30% 
 0.0700 0.0703 0.3514 0.9281 1.636 0.0004 
       
 25% vs. 60% 25% vs. 80% 25% vs. 85% 30% vs. 60% 30% vs. 
80% 
30% vs. 85% 
 0.7208 1.324 1.982 0.730 1.277 1.936 
       
 60% vs. 80% 60% vs. 85% 80% vs. 85%    
 0.2278 0.9166 0.8285    
       
Age 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 577.59*** 302.32***     
       
Occup-Nonfarm 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 1245.15*** 849.59***     
       
Tenure-mixed 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 396.94*** 103.73***     
       
Tenure-tenant 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 0.0167*** 8.82***     
       
Org-Partner 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 44.74*** 148.85***     
       
Org-Incorp 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 78.38*** 69.36***     
       
Org-Other 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
 † †     
       
Year 2007 25% vs. 50% 50% vs. 75%         
  36.13*** 38.21***         




Table 3.6: 𝜒2 Statistics for Pairwise Hypothesis Testing on Statistically Significant Marginal Effect Estimates 𝛽(𝜏), for 
Farm Operators Classified as Producing Wheat as the Major Crop  
Note: The critical values for 𝜒2 statistic with “1” degree of freedom are 2.71, 3.84, and 6.64 for significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% respectively.‘*’: significant at the 10% level; ‘**’: significant at the 5% level; ‘***’: significant at the 1% 
level.† denotes that either one or both of the marginal effect estimates pair were statistically insignificant at the 10% 
level, and thus pairwise hypothesis testing was not conducted.   
GovPay/acre  20% vs. 
25% 
20% vs. 35%  20% vs. 50% 20% vs. 55% 20% vs. 60% 20% vs. 65% 
 0.1377 0.2341 2.00 2.61 1.34 0.6034 
       
 20% vs. 
85% 
25% vs. 35% 25% vs. 50% 25% vs. 55% 25% vs. 60% 25% vs. 65% 
 1.86 0.6620 2.68 3.33* 1.78 0.8060 
       
 25% vs. 
85% 
35% vs. 50% 35% vs. 55% 35% vs. 60% 35% vs. 65% 35% vs. 85% 
 1.99 1.32 1.81 0.7980 0.2817 1.55 
       
 50% vs. 
55% 
50% vs. 60% 50% vs. 65% 50% vs. 85% 55% vs. 60% 55% vs. 65% 
 0.2216 0.0072 0.0526 0.8267 0.2738 0.3100 
       
 55% vs. 
85% 
60% vs. 65% 60% vs. 85% 65% vs. 85%   
 0.5502 0.0703 0.8847 1.13   
       
Age 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 3376.40*** 2576.69***     
       
Occup-Nonfarm 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 127.70*** 40.74***     
       
Tenure-mixed 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 25.48*** 8.02***     
       
Tenure-tenant 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 2.16*** 7.94***     
       
Org-Partner 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 28.13*** 59.19***     
       
Org-Incorp 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 5.13** 7.80***     
       
Org-Other 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
 † †     
       
Year 2007 25% vs. 
50% 
50% vs. 75%         
  † 3.38*         





              Table 4.1 : Proportion of Rejection of the Null (t=2) 
 theta 
n 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
50 1.8 2.2 3 2.8 4 5.1 8.4 10.2 12.6 15.6 21.5 
100 2.8 3.1 5.2 7.9 12.1 15.7 20.6 29.8 35 43.8 49.4 
200 3.5 5.9 9.7 15.9 24.2 39 46.6 63 68.8 76.5 83 
400 2.8 4.9 17.1 35.9 52.2 69.8 82.9 92.2 96.4 98.3 98.7 


















Table 4.2 : Proportion of Rejection of the Null (t=7) 
 theta 
n 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
100 3.1 6 11.8 22.4 34.4 52.4 66.1 78.1 83.6 90.3 94.2 
200 3.5 7.8 24 46.1 73.4 84.3 96.2 98.7 99.7 99.9 100 
400 3.7 15.6 52.5 80.9 97.6 99.9 100 100 100 100 100 
800 4 30.1 86.9 99.3 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 


















Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of Government Payments per Acre on Farm Size for Operators Classified as Producing Corn 
and Soybeans as Major Crop.  
Note: The dependent variable is land in farm (land owned +rented in – rented out) measured in acres. The solid line 
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Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of Government Payments per Acre on Farm Size for Operators Classified as Producing 
Wheat as Major Crop 
Note: The dependent variable is land in farm (land owned +rented in – rented out) measured in acres. The solid line 
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